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On the Nature of a Cooperative:                 
A System of Attributes Perspective 
 
Li Feng and George Hendrikse1
Abstract 
In the 1950s and 1960s there was a debate about the nature of an agricultural 
cooperative: the cooperative as extension of the farm, the cooperative as vertical 
integration or the cooperative as a firm. We revisit this debate with various 
concepts from the theory of the firm that have been formulated since 1990. Two 
concepts shed light on this debate: the enterprise as a system of attributes and the 
delineation of a governance structure in terms of ownership rights, control rights 
and income rights. We argue that viewing the cooperative as a system of attributes 
integrates these three views. It emphasizes that a cooperative is a firm in itself, 
with many input suppliers as owners. The feature of many input suppliers as 
owners implies that the behavioral differences between a cooperative and an 
investor owned firm have to be addressed by highlighting the unique aspects of 
the stakeholder owning the enterprise. 
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1 Introduction 
A widespread and important governance structure in many agricultural markets is 
the cooperative. For example, the European Union has 132,000 cooperatives with 
83.5 million members and 2.3 million employees in 2001 (Commission of the 
European Communities 2001), the United States of America has 47.000 
cooperatives with 100 million members in 2001 (USDA 2002), and China has 
94,771 cooperatives with 1,193 million members in 2002 (Hu 2005). In the EU, 
cooperative firms are responsible for over 60% of the harvest, handling and 
marketing of agricultural products, with a turnover of approximately 210,000 
million euros (Galdeano et al 2005). 
An agricultural producer cooperative is an association of independent 
members who jointly own a downstream processor (Sexton 1984). When a group 
of farmers form a cooperative, they agree mutually to set up a downstream 
enterprise and operate it jointly as an integral part of their individual firms. An 
essential feature of the cooperative is the ownership by the members over the 
downstream assets. Farmers not only hold formal authority and take 
responsibilities over the downstream enterprise, but also share the costs and 
revenues as residual claimants. They are, meanwhile, independent, in the sense 
that they do not necessarily collaborate or coordinate with each other on other 
aspects of their individual farm enterprises.  
The alliance among all parties involved in a producer cooperative can be split 
into two parts. One is the horizontal relationship among the members who grow 
produce and then deliver them to the downstream stage. A cooperative in this 
aspect resembles an output association. An agricultural output association either 
grades, packages, handles, and stores the products of many farm enterprises 
together; or bargains, negotiates and contracts as a big unit with processors or 
retailers with respect to the processing, shipping or marketing of the output. By 
forming an association, part of members’ assets and activities are combined 
together: they coordinate in some dimension, and meanwhile maximize 
independently the profits of their own farm enterprises. What distinguishes a 
cooperative from an output association is the second element of the alliance, the 
vertical relationship between growers and processor. On the one hand, the 
members possess residual rights over the processor. Collectively, they own the 
cooperative and make vital decisions upon important issues regarding it; they 
incur also the costs and share the residual rights over its capital and profits. On the 
other hand, the growers act also as the patrons of the processor by providing 
inputs. Members of cooperative are entitled to priority access so that the processor 
is not allowed to reject their produce. 
The nature of an agricultural cooperative has been debated ever since the 
1950s and 1960s. There is substantial literature on the issue and significant 
contributions have been published about the cooperative being an extension of the 
farm, vertical integration, or an enterprise (Robotka 1947, Phillips 1953, Savage 
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1954, Trifon 1961 and Helmberger & Hoos 1962 among others). The extension of 
the farm view maintains that the cooperative is just an association of firms, not a 
new firm per se; it has no entrepreneurial unit (Phillips 1953). With this 
conception of the cooperative, all of the attention is centered on (the entrepreneurs 
of) the member firms. The interdependencies between the various activities in the 
portfolio of a farm enterprise are thus highlighted. The firm view advocates that a 
cooperative is itself a business enterprise and an economic entity, and a new 
decision-making body is created by the formation of a cooperative (Robotka 1947, 
p103; Helmberger & Hoos 1962, p290). It looks upon a cooperative as a special 
type of firm capable of making entrepreneurial decisions just as any private 
corporation (Savage 1954). The characteristics of an economic unit set up by 
cooperative members (for example, a processor) as an enterprise are stressed. The 
vertical integration view advocates the view that member firms are integrated in 
the sense that several stages in the production process are brought under one 
entrepreneurial control (Phillips 1953, p79; Sexton 1986). Therefore the 
interaction and vertical relationship between two stages of production (e.g., 
upstream farm and downstream processor) becomes the focus of analysis, usually 
with one upstream and one downstream party. 
The emergence in the late 1980s and the 1990s of new concepts in the theory 
of the firm may provide an opportunity to reconsider the nature of cooperative. 
This may be valuable for the standard reasons. Applying new concepts to 
cooperatives may result in new propositions about cooperatives. These 
propositions can be used descriptively, i.e. confront them with data, or they can be 
used prescriptively, i.e. formulate advice for either cooperatives or public policies. 
Cooperatives may benefit because these concepts may be helpful in addressing a 
variety of issues, like member commitment, transfer prices, sourcing, restructuring, 
and diversification. It may assist in formulating public policies, particularly 
competition policies that may either grant cooperatives a special status, or classify 
them as anti-competitive in terms of a cartel or a vertical restraint. Recent 
discussions on the legal status of cooperatives in the European Union are an 
illustration (Menard 2007). Therefore, we revisit this debate with concepts that 
have been formulated since 1990.  
Two concepts are highlighted: the enterprise as a system of attributes and the 
delineation of a governance structure in terms of ownership rights, control rights 
and income rights. The system of attributes view proposes that organizations are 
composed of attributes. Each attribute represents a certain aspect of the 
organization. The systemic effects are stressed because the payoff associated with 
the level of one attribute depends on the level of all the other attributes. Attributes 
are therefore interdependent. By characterizing the cooperative as a system of 
attributes we integrate the three positions taken in the debate. It emphasizes that a 
cooperative is an enterprise in itself with a specific group of stakeholders as 
owners. It is a governing body of its own. That is, the processing stage of 
production of a producer cooperative should be at the center of the analysis in our 
view, with a special role assigned to the unique aspects characterizing the 
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members, i.e. highlighting the transaction relationship as well as the investor 
relationship of the farmers with the cooperative.  
In what follows, we confront the debate regarding the nature of the 
cooperative with the conceptual developments in the theory of the firm of the last 
20 years. Section 2 briefly reviews the debate of 50 years ago.  Section 3 
formulates two conceptual developments in the theory of the firm. Section 4 
readdresses the debate using these concepts. Section 5 concludes with formulating 
directions for further research regarding cooperatives. 
2 The debate on the nature of an agricultural cooperative 
Three positions of contention can be distinguished in the literature on the nature of 
an agricultural cooperative: the cooperative as extension of the farm (Trifon 1961; 
Staatz 1983, Menard 2007), vertical integration between two parties (Sexton 1986), 
or the cooperative as a firm (Robotka 1947, Savage 1954, Helmberger & Hoos 
1962). The core of the contention on this issue is the analytical emphasis, should it 
be on farms, on the processor, or on (the interaction) of both? Though some of the 
articles have actually aspects of various positions to a different extent, we classify 
them according to their main positions. 
Referring to a cooperative both as ‘an extension of their entrepreneurial 
functioning’ (p113) and as ‘concerted integration’ (p102), Robotka (1947) does 
not intentionally make a clear distinction between the cooperative’s nature as 
‘vertical integration’ or ‘extension of the farm’. The non-profit feature of the 
cooperative provides support for the ‘extension of farm’ perspective, while the 
collective ownership of upstream farmers over downstream assets characterized in 
the article can be seen as an argument for the position that the cooperative is 
viewed as vertical integration. What is more important is, however, his 
observation that ‘a new economic entity emerges when a cooperative association 
is formed, because participants must agree to submit to group decisions questions 
relating to the activity being coordinated’ (p113). This crucial last point leads us to 
classify this paper in support of the cooperative as a firm position.  
Phillips (1953) is also equivocal on the distinction among the three positions. 
On the one hand, it mentions both ‘concerted integration’ (p85) and the analogy of 
a cooperative as a plant of a multi-plant firm (p75): ‘The participating firms are 
ordinarily vertically integrated in the sense that the output of the joint plant is the 
raw product input of the individual plants of the participating firms – or 
alternatively, the output of the individual plants of the participating firms is the 
raw product input of the joint plant (p79).’; ‘Such participating firms are 
integrated in the sense that several stages in the production process are brought 
under one entrepreneurial control (p79).’ On the other hand, the article states that 
the cooperative is not a new firm (p75) based on the argument that a firm is not a 
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firm unless it seeks profits for itself, which is an ex parte statement per se. 
Nevertheless, the arguments that ‘The cooperative … has no entrepreneurial unit; 
its member units each have their entrepreneur’ and ‘the cooperative association 
consists of the sum of the multi-lateral agreements among the firms participating 
in the joint activity (p76)’ emphasizes that the focus of analysis has to be on the 
farm enterprises according to Phillips. This is the extension of the farm position. 
Phillips’ focus on the farms was soon challenged by Savage (1954), a comment 
on Phillips’ work, which considers a cooperative as a firm capable of making 
entrepreneurial decisions just as any other private corporations. ‘Though farmers 
own their cooperatives and control them in the broad sense of the word, they do 
not make all or most of the entrepreneurial decisions’ (p531). ‘The delegation of 
decision rights is the common practice of cooperative. The individual farmers pool 
certain of their entrepreneurial functions and in doing so they authorized a 
collective body to perform these functions for them. In the process the farmers 
create an agency and defer to it some of their individual prerogatives’ (p532). 
Therefore the article concludes that the cooperative should be seen as a ‘going 
concern performing entrepreneurial functions delegated to them’ (p532). 
Helmberger & Hoos (1962) denies Phillips’ analogy between a cooperative 
and a vertically integrated firm based on the argument that ‘when agricultural 
producers jointly undertake the creation of a cooperative association, they seek 
goods and services provided at cost’ (p280), rather than a high return on their 
investments like investors in the usual type of business enterprise. Furthermore, 
the paper holds that the cooperative, in spite of its different intended objectives 
from an Investor owned firm (IOF), is a firm, a decision-making entity, given that 
the ‘theory of the firm can be adapted to reflect the cooperative’s peculiar 
economic nature’ (p281).  
While acknowledging that the cooperatives resemble to a certain extent the 
characteristics of a vertical integration, namely, their ‘subjugation to external 
economic control’ (p216) and the absence of a profit-seeking purpose, Trifon 
(1961) stresses that the plurality of interests of the members distinguishes the 
cooperatives from vertical integration, one with a single locus of profit 
maximization. It points out that the cooperative, as an aggregate of economic units, 
is ‘functioning only as a branch or part of the associated economic units’ 
(p215-216), which is clearly the extension of the farm view. 
Staatz (1983) highlights also the members by addressing the issue of ‘group 
choice in a cooperative when members have at least partially divergent goals and 
engage in strategic behavior’ (p1084). Cooperative decision making in the context 
of heterogeneous membership is conceptualized as n-person cooperative game. 
This is again the extension of the farm view. 
Sexton (1986), however, considers a cooperative as vertical integration in the 
marketing chain in light of their functional similarities. In his focus on the income 
rights aspects of cooperatives, he characterizes a cooperative as ‘a horizontal club 
organized to accomplish vertical integration’ (p215). The similarity with Staatz is 
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that he adopts also the method of cooperative game theory.  
The nature of a cooperative continues to receive attention nowadays. A recent 
article by Menard (2007) categorizes the cooperative as a hybrid. According to 
this paper, what distinguishes a hybrid from an integrated firm is that ‘they 
maintain distinct and autonomous property and decision rights regarding most 
assets’ (p5). Yet ‘they simultaneously share some strategic resources, which 
require a tight coordination going far beyond what the price system can provide 
and thus makes them different from a pure market arrangement’ (p5). Focusing all 
attention on the transactions and interactions between the cooperative firm and its 
members, the article can be viewed as supporting the position that the cooperative 
is an extension of the farm. 
3 Conceptual developments regarding the nature of the 
firm 
This section formulates two conceptual developments regarding the nature of the 
enterprise since the late 1980s. Subsection 3.1 addresses the enterprise as a system 
of attributes, while the delineation of a governance structure in terms of ownership 
rights, control rights and income rights is addressed in subsection 3.2. 
3.1 System of attributes 
The enterprise as a system of attributes is introduced by Milgrom and Roberts 
(1990). It proposes that an organization is composed of interdependent and 
interactive attributes and can therefore be perceived as a system. An organization 
consists of many attributes. An attribute represents a certain aspect of an 
organization, like an organizational department, an activity undertaken or a policy 
carried out by the organization. Examples of attributes are production technology, 
marketing, sourcing, logistics, communication, personnel, accounting, financing, 
authority and reward scheme. An attribute has multiple values such as “big” and 
“small”, “weak” and “strong,” or “rigid” and “flexible”. Figure 1 provides an 
illustration of a system with three attributes. It can represent, for instance, a dairy 
cooperative characterized by three attributes, x1 as the production technology 
(geared towards ‘bulk’ or ‘specialty’ products), x2 as sourcing (‘make’ or ‘buy’), 
and x3 as financing (‘retained earnings’ or ‘certificates’). 
 
Figure 1. A System of Attributes 
  
X1
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X3 X2
The attributes are related to each other and have therefore to be aligned. They 
form a system because the payoff associated with the level of one attribute 
depends on the level of all the other attributes. If the value of any attribute is 
changed, then the marginal return to increase in any or all of the remaining 
activities changes. The complementarity among group of activities is thus at the 
center of this perspective. Exploiting these complementarities requires coordinated 
action between the separate attributes. 
3.2 Governance 
Governance concerns the organization of transactions, whereas a governance 
structure consists of a collection of rules structuring the transactions between the 
various stakeholders. A standard way of delineating a governance structure is to 
distinguish income and decision rights (Hansmann 1996).2 Income rights address 
the question ‘How are benefits and costs allocated?’. Income rights specify the 
rights to receive the benefits, and obligations to pay the costs, that are associated 
with the use of an asset, thereby creating the incentive system faced by decision 
makers. They will be reflected in the composition of costs and payment schemes. 
Important themes regarding income rights are payment schemes, cost allocation 
schemes, the compensation package for the CEO and the other members of the 
board of directors, and the effects of horizontal as well as vertical competition. 
The analysis of income rights / incentives is the realm of complete 
contracting theory in the form of agency relationships (Hendrikse 2003). The 
working hypothesis is that everything that is known, can and will be incorporated 
in the design of optimal remuneration schemes / contracts without costs 
(Holmstrom 1979 and 1982).  
Decision rights in the form of authority and responsibility address the 
question ‘Who has authority or control (regarding the use of assets)?’. The 
organizational chart describes roughly the formal structure, and can be represented 
 
2 McAfee (2002) uses the terms incentives and authority. 
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by decision rights. Decision rights concern all rights and rules regarding the 
deployment and use of assets. They specify who directs the firm’s activities, i.e. 
the allocation of authority. Important themes regarding authority are its allocation 
(‘make-or-buy’ decision), formal versus real authority, relational contracts, access, 
decision control (ratification, monitoring), decision management (initiation, 
implementation), task design, conflict resolution, and enforcement mechanisms. A 
recent development is that decision rights are distinguished into ownership and 
control rights (Baker et al. 2006). 
Decision rights matter because contracts are in general incomplete, due to the 
complexity of the transaction or the vagueness of language. The incompleteness of 
contracts is completed by allocating authority to somebody to decide in 
circumstances not covered by the contract. Incomplete contracting theory 
addresses decision rights / authority (Grossman and Hart 1986 and Hart and 
Moore 1990). The starting point is that the design of contracts is costly, which 
results in incomplete contracts. Incomplete contracts allocate decision power in 
situations left open by formal (incentive) contracts. The focus is on 
non-contractible actions. Authority has no meaning in a complete contracting 
setting because everything is covered in the contract. 
4 Revisiting the debate  
This section readdresses the debate about the nature of the cooperative by using 
the concepts of the previous section. The articles in section 2 can be easily 
disqualified when the focus is entirely on the formal models presented. They are 
neo-classical, production function models. These models are valuable in a market 
context in order to determine demand and supply relationships, while the models 
by Staatz (1983) and Sexton (1986) are geared towards cost allocation issues. 3 
The models in the papers reviewed in section 2, except for Menard (2007), are 
 
3 We like to express our appreciation for two models represented in the articles highlighted 
in section 2. First, the way Trifon solves his model is nowadays characterized as Nash 
equilibrium. In 1961 he states already that ‘… “equilibrium” … is marked by the fact that 
no individual would independently attempt further adjustments once the state has been 
reached.’ (p222) and solves his model according to this recipe. Second, the well known 
model by Sexton uses, like the seminal model of Hart and Moore (1990) in the incomplete 
contracting literature, cooperative game theory in order to address vertical integration. 
However, there are at least three differences. First, the model of Sexton does not specify a 
downstream party. Second, Sexton uses one cooperative game to analyse various 
governance structures, while Hart and Moore specify a different cooperative game for each 
governance structure. Finally, the focus of Sexton is on different revenue and cost 
allocation schemes, i.e. income rights, while Hart and Moore use cooperative game theory 
to determine the bargaining strength of each party in each governance structure in a 
consistent way, i.e. decision rights.    
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nowadays considered to be models about income rights.4 It is hard to distinguish 
the three perspectives regarding cooperatives (vertical integration, extension of the 
member farms, enterprise) when only an income rights perspective is taken. The 
focus will therefore be on the ideas and insights expressed in these papers. 
The strong point of the view that a cooperative is an extension of the farm is 
that it gears attention towards the portfolio of farm activities and assets. The 
investment decisions by farmers will be guided by bringing the farm to value and 
will therefore have an impact on the decisions of the cooperative. However, the 
downstream stage of production is neglected. This view does not survive the 
Savage critique / requirement that a cooperative is much more than a formalization 
of cooperation. Rather, it is a special governance structure regarding ‘a going 
concern’. 
The vertical integration view is also not without problems. The main problem 
is that it considers solely the (attribute covering the) exchange between the 
upstream farms and the downstream processor. It may therefore neglect the impact 
of the multiplicity of the attributes of the upstream parties on the exchange 
relationship with the cooperative. Member firms transfer only the decision rights 
regarding a subset of their attributes to the cooperative. Meanwhile they are 
autonomous economic units that maintain distinct property rights and their 
associated decision rights on other attributes. Robotka (1947, p105-106) 
recognizes this important feature of cooperatives when he writes ‘Members form a 
cooperative by reaching mutual agreements involving certain activities that 
participants had previously performed individually. On those jointly activities 
members of a cooperative have to function cooperatively by voluntarily choosing 
their individual values of the related attributes in accordance with others. Instead 
of making their entrepreneurial decisions on their own, the members of a 
cooperative pool together part of their decision rights and surrender part of their 
sovereignties to group decisions regarding to the joint activities.’ 
Moreover, vertical integration is characterized in the literature generally by 
the concepts such as common governance and leadership, joint planning, 
centralized decision making, and transfer of decisions to a distinct entity in charge 
of coordinating their actions. The extent to which a cooperative is vertically 
integrated depends on closeness between the allocation of ownership rights and 
the allocation of control rights (Menard 2007). As a matter of fact, the intensity of 
members’ control over the activities of the cooperative is not as high as vertical 
integration would entail, because the decision rights are to a large extent delegated 
to the downstream processor whereas property rights are still in hands of 
members. 
 
4 There are three main economic approaches towards modelling cooperatives (Hendrikse 
2003 and Menard 2007): the production function approach, the complete contracting / 
principal-agent approach and the incomplete contracting / transaction costs economics 
approach. The first two approaches address income rights, while the third approach deals 
with issues regarding the allocation of ownership and control rights. 
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The separation of ownership and control in cooperative practice is in line 
with Hansmann’s observation (1988, p269) that ‘often the persons who have the 
formal right to control the firm- which typically takes the form of the right to elect 
the firm’s board of directors- in fact exercise little effective authority by this mean 
over the firm’s management’. He argues (on p275) that, where ownership of the 
firm is shared among a large class of patrons, like in the cooperative, ‘highly 
participatory forms of decision making will not be efficient. Rather, in such 
situations, it is often more efficient, to assign only the formal right of control to 
persons who are not in a position to exercise that right very effectively.’ and ‘A 
firm of any substantial size and complexity needs a hierarchical form of 
organization for decision making, which means that the firm must have a single 
locus of executive power with substantial discretion and authority.’ This implies 
that letting members control and manage the cooperative is not efficient. In 
cooperative situations, control will generally be exercised by the firm’s owners 
indirectly through voting for members of the board of directors, who then select 
their own presiding officers and hire a manager of CEO to manage the cooperative. 
Direct participation of members in decision making will be confined to approval 
of major structural changes, such as merger and dissolution. The hired 
management of the cooperative is in charge of the daily affairs most of the time 
(Hendrikse 2005). 
Notice that these ideas are also in line with Barton (1989) and Baker et al. 
(2006). Barton (1989) distinguishes a cooperative from other businesses by three 
principles: user-owner principle, user-control principle, and user-benefits 
principle.5 He views as fundamental to the governance of a cooperative that these 
rights are possessed simultaneously by the same party, i.e., the users (or patrons) 
of a cooperative. Members vote only on proposed policies regarding key issues, 
‘even though they delegate most management decisions to the board.’  (Barton, 
1989, p15). Baker et al. argue that firms can and do transfer control across fixed 
firm boundaries without changing asset ownership.  
Our position is that the firm from a system of attributes perspective is able to 
integrate the three views discussed in the above debate by considering the 
cooperative as a system of attributes. Looking upon a cooperative as a system, as 
proposed by the firm view, allows to represent the features of the plurality of 
interests of the extension of the farm view and the transaction relationship 
between the member and the cooperative of the vertical integration view. A 
graphic illustration of a cooperative consisting of two members and one processor 
is provided in figure 2. The essence of the agreement members enter into involves 
a commitment on the part of each of them to submit certain issues to group 
decisions (Robotka 1947). Each of these member firms is an independent and 
autonomous organization in itself. A farmer is represented in figure 2 by a system 
 
5 These principles seem to have been formulated independently from the incomplete 
contracting literature, while they are very similar to the distinction in terms of ownership 
rights, control rights, and income rights by Baker et al. (2006). 
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of three attributes. For example, a dairy farmer may be characterized by the 
attributes x1 as his wheat production (‘yes’ or ‘no’), x2 as his dairy transaction 
relationship with the dairy cooperative (‘delivery requirement’ or ‘no delivery 
requirement’), and x3 as ownership of the dairy cooperative (‘member’ or ‘no 
member’). The boundary of the cooperative is visualized by the rectangle. Within 
it lie the processor with all its attributes and two attributes of both farmers, i.e. the 
transaction and ownership attributes. 
 
Figure 2. A Cooperative 
 
 
 
  
X1
X2X3X2X3
X1
Farmers
 
 
 
Processor 
 
 
 
The separation of ownership rights and decision rights, formal and real 
authority, which is prominent in a cooperative actually also prevails in the 
conventional firm. The standard business corporation, which is normally owned 
by investors, persons who lend capital to the firm, is in a sense nothing more than 
a special type of producer cooperative- a lenders’ cooperative, or capital 
cooperative (Hansmann 1988). The conventional IOFs assign their formal rights 
of control to their owners, capital providers, while the real authority is usually 
exerted by the hired management of the firm. The income rights allocation in 
cooperatives and IOFs are also essentially the same. Benefits or losses of the 
cooperative are distributed to its users on the basis of their use (Barton 1989). At 
regular intervals, profits or losses made in the cooperative are distributed pro rata 
among the members according to the amount of their patronages. Similarly, an 
IOF’s net earnings and losses are distributed as well pro rata among the investors 
according to the amount they have lent. From the perspective of decision rights 
and income rights allocation, a cooperative is comparable to a conventional firm, 
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which is always analyzed as an autonomous entity, rather than the extension of the 
investors or investing firms. 
In order to highlight the difference between a cooperative and an investor 
owned firm, we present in figure 3 an investor owned dairy enterprise. The 
difference with figure 2 is that the investors have only one attribute involved with 
the dairy enterprise. The delivery of milk is not a relevant attribute in the portfolio 
of activities or assets of the investor, i.e. x2 has to represent another aspect of the 
portfolio of activities or assets of the investor. 
 
Figure 3. Investor Owned Firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X3 X3
X2X1 X1 X2
Investors 
Processor 
 
Another way to clarify our position on the nature of a cooperative is to follow 
Bonus (1986) in comparing a franchise with a cooperative. The two dominating 
features of a franchise are its brand and business format. This determines the 
activities of the franchisees. The relationship between members and the 
cooperative is much looser than the relationship between franchisees and the 
franchise. A farmer is usually a member of various cooperatives due to the various 
crops grown at the farm, while a franchisee does not operate in multiple franchise 
systems.6 In figure 2 we have therefore presented the core of the farm as a system 
of attributes outside the box demarcating the cooperative, i.e. a farm is a sovereign 
 
6 One of the terms included in many franchise contracts is ‘passive ownership’ (Brickley 
1999). This contract provision restricts the franchisee from allocating effort to outside 
activities. 
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economic unit.7 Applying the terminology of Williamson (1991), our position can 
be characterized as a cooperative being a hierarchy.8
Summarizing, we integrate the three positions in the debate by considering a 
cooperative as a system of attributes. The main feature is that a cooperative is a 
firm, conceptualized as a system. The system consists of attributes capturing on 
the one hand the processor as a system and on the other hand that many farmers 
collectively own the cooperative enterprise, i.e. the vertical integration aspect, and 
that usually multiple attributes of a farm enterprise are involved, i.e. the ownership 
of assets of the cooperative and the transaction relationship with it. 
5 Conclusions and further research 
We reviewed a debate about the nature of a cooperative originating more than 50 
years ago. The literature is classified in terms of three views regarding a 
cooperative: a cooperative as an extension of the farm, as vertical integration, or 
as a firm. This article readdress this debate by using modern concepts of the 
theory of the firm, like the firm as a system of attributes and the delineation of a 
governance structure in terms of ownership rights, control rights, and income 
rights. We emphasize that a cooperative is to be viewed as a firm, where its 
owners as input suppliers have unique characteristics.  
The core of an agricultural cooperative is member control over the 
infrastructure at the downstream stage of production. It provides members with 
market power and access to input/output markets. Furthermore, a cooperative has 
a member, rather than value added, orientation. It mainly serves member interests, 
rather than just Return On Investment at the downstream stage of production. Our 
view entails some preferences about future research regarding cooperatives. Three 
of these preferences are formulated. First, future research may pay more explicit 
attention to what are the unique aspects of the members owning the cooperative, 
compared with investors as owners of an investor owned firm. A cooperative is 
supposed to serve member interests and to generate maximum value in processing. 
Nearly always being user oriented (Barton 1989), a cooperative is designed for the 
former task, and because the organizational structure required for the two tasks is 
different, it is expected to have an impact on the latter task.9 An example of a 
 
7 The same applies of course to the investors owning an investor owned firm.  
8 Williamson distinguishes the governance structures market, hybrid and hierarchy. Bonus 
(1986, p335) summarizes his position as ‘The cooperative association is a hybrid 
organizational mode …’, although he states later on the same page that ‘… a firm jointly 
owned by the holders of transaction-specific resources …’. Hendrikse and Veerman (2001) 
classify a cooperative as a hierarchy.
9 We agree with Sexton (1984, p429) when he writes ‘Labor-managed firms are closely 
analogous to agricultural marketing cooperatives. Cooperatively processing and marketing 
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unique aspect of members as owners of a cooperative having an impact on 
generating maximum value in processing is the single origin constraint, i.e. a 
cooperative will never abandon the inputs of its members. This may result in a 
different product portfolio of cooperatives compared to investor owned firms 
(Hendrikse and Smit 2007). 
Second, other attributes of the upstream farms may have influences on the 
decisions of a cooperative. Farmers are usually a member of various cooperatives. 
These cooperatives may be one-product cooperatives, or multiple-product 
cooperatives. For example, sugar cooperative Royal Cosun processes sugar beets, 
but also other vegetables. Some of their members have a transaction and investor 
relationship with Royal Cosun regarding the sugar beets, while they only have a 
transaction relation with Royal Cosun, i.e. themselves, regarding the other 
vegetables. The desirability of this arrangement is not clear (Dixit 1997 and 2002). 
Another illustration is a feature of cooperatives known as the portfolio problem. 
An important consideration of members in the diversification decision of a 
cooperative may be spreading of risks of their individual farm portfolio, which 
may result in members ‘… will pressure cooperative decision makers to rearrange 
the cooperative’s investment portfolio, even if the reduced risk portfolio means 
lower expected returns.’ (Cook 1995, p1157). It implies that a cooperative 
diversifies most likely in a different way than an investor owned enterprise. More 
information about the relationship between the farm portfolio of members and the 
product portfolio of a cooperative seems therefore desirable. Census data may 
shed light on this relationship.   
Third, collective ownership among many growers requires a method for 
collective decision-making. Most commonly a democratic decision-making 
procedure of some sort is employed. Votes in cooperatives and associations are 
usually weighted by volume of patronage, although some cooperatives adhere to a 
one-member-one-vote scheme. A problem with these collective decision-making 
procedures is that they may yield decisions that are (collectively) inefficient in the 
sense that they do not maximize aggregate grower surplus (Hart and Moore 1996). 
It entails that decision power is to a certain extent allocated independently of 
quantity and / or quality. Collective ownership of the downstream cooperative by 
many upstream growers seems to require therefore that a model specifying at least 
two members and a downstream/upstream party. This is a necessity to investigate 
the plurality of interests prevailing in cooperative decision making.  
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